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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
William Dougherty, III, was charged with a single count of eluding a police officer. Prior
to his trial, Mr. Dougherty’s counsel successfully moved to withdraw (based on a breakdown of
the attorney-client relationship) and Mr. Dougherty was left unrepresented. Ultimately, he was
forced to go to trial pro se and was found guilty as charged. He also appeared pro se at his
sentencing.
Because the district court never gave Mr. Dougherty a Faretta1 warning, or otherwise
made any effort to determine whether Mr. Dougherty was knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waiving his right to counsel and exercising his right to represent himself, the district
court violated Mr. Dougherty’s Sixth Amendment rights.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Shortly after terminating the pursuit of a speeding motorcyclist who had evaded multiple
officers multiple times, William Dougherty was stopped because he fit the vague description of
the sought-after motorcyclist. (See generally 7/14/15 Tr., p.89, L.1 – p.140, L.15.) Although
Mr. Dougherty had not been violating any traffic laws when he was stopped (7/14/15 Tr., p.134,
L.20 – p.136, L.1), because officers believed he was the one who had led them on a high speed
chase, he was arrested (7/14/15 Tr., p.101, Ls.5-15, p.102, L.21 – p.103, L.2, p.127, Ls.3-11, 21-

1

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta, the Supreme Court held that under the
Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant not only has a right to the assistance of counsel, but also
a right of self-representation. It also held, however, that in order for a defendant to represent
himself, he must knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel. Id. at 835. To validly
relinquish his right to counsel and represent himself, he “should be made aware of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he
is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’” Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
1

23, p.129, Ls.5-15, p.139, L.2 – p.140, L.1). A few days later, the State filed a Criminal
Complaint charging Mr. Dougherty with a single count of felony eluding. (R., pp.12-13.)
The predominant issue before the trial court concerned Mr. Dougherty’s right to the
“assistance of counsel.” When Mr. Dougherty requested the “assistance of counsel”—which is
something he did early and often—he was requesting “hybrid counsel” (also known as “cocounsel”).2
At Mr. Dougherty’s first appearance (on the day the complaint was filed), the presiding
magistrate asked if Mr. Dougherty wanted the court to consider an application for the
appointment of a public defender; in answer to that question, Mr. Dougherty started to explore
what, exactly, that meant, and to state his concern that, owing to his faith, he could not accept
full representation by another, but the court cut him off, directing him fill out an application if he
wanted the public defender.

(8/11/14 Tr., p.9, L.19 – p.10, L.14.)

Moments later,

Mr. Dougherty expressed his frustration with working through the criminal justice system as a
layman, and said he needed an “interpreter” to navigate the legal process. (8/11/14 Tr., p.12,
Ls.9-20.) The court’s response was to tell him again that he could apply for a public defender.
(8/11/14 Tr., p.12, Ls.21-25.) When Mr. Dougherty again stated that it was “not possible” for
him to accept a public defender in the traditional sense, the court was dismissive, telling him,
“Well, you’re between a rock and a hard place, then.” (8/11/14 Tr., p.13, Ls.1-3.) It then
immediately ended the hearing, remarking, “I’ve had enough of Mr. Dougherty.” (8/11/14
Tr., p.13, Ls.5-6.)

2

“[H]ybrid representation consists of concurrent self-representation and representation by
counsel.” Colquitt, Joseph, Hybrid Representation: Standing the Two-Sided Coin on its Edge, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 74 (2003). An excellent discussion of hybrid representation, with a
clear explanation of how it differs from traditional attorney representation, self-representation,
and “advisory” or “standby” representation, can be found in Joseph Colquitt’s article.
2

Consistent with his beliefs, Mr. Dougherty did not make application for appointment of a
public defender initially, and he appeared pro se for his preliminary hearing (before the same
magistrate who presided over his first appearance). (See 8/22/14 Tr., p.1, Ls.15-18.) At that
hearing, the court dismissed Mr. Dougherty’s initial concerns about a lack of access to legal
materials, 3 basically telling him he should have applied for a public defender. (See 8/22/14
Tr., p.1, Ls.9-23.) Later, Mr. Dougherty stated his desire for “co-counsel”; again, the court
indicated he should have applied for a public defender. (8/22/14 Tr., p.13, Ls.9-11.) Later still,
when Mr. Dougherty complained further about a lack of access to legal materials, the prosecutor
interjected, arguing the Mr. Dougherty needed the assistance of counsel. (8/22/14 Tr., p.66,
Ls.8-25.) At that point, Mr. Dougherty reiterated that he could not accept the representation of
the public defender because it was against his religion, but because he needed the assistance of
counsel, he sought the appointment of co-counsel. (8/22/14 Tr., p.67, Ls.13-19.) The court
commented, “Well, and I don’t know how to deal with that,” and it continued with the
preliminary hearing. (8/22/14 Tr., p.67, Ls.2-24.) Finally, at the end of the preliminary hearing,
the court revisited—and punted—the co-counsel issue:
JUDGE: I’ll let you comply with discovery and . . . and take those matters up.
You know Mr. Dougherty, as Mr. Payne said in his argument, and as I tried to tell
you at your first appearance, I don’t know what it is about the religious position
that you have that prevents you from making application for an attorney. Maybe
Judge Gibler will decide just to appoint a lawyer to represent you, but I’m going
to let Judge Gibler . . .
DOUGHERTY: So in the past . . . in other . . . in other venues . . .
JUDGE: I’m just going to let Judge Gibler address those issues with you, so.
DOUGHERTY: . . . in other venues they’ve given me co-assistance of Counsel
because we need some translation between me and the Court.

3

Mr. Dougherty was obviously in custody at the time of his preliminary hearing, as he had a
motion for bond reduction pending. (See 8/22/14 Tr., p.1, Ls.23-25.)
3

JUDGE: And maybe that’s what . . . how Judge Gibler will decide to deal with it,
so. We’ll be in recess.
(8/22/14 Tr., p.86, Ls.1-15 (ellipses in original).) Mr. Dougherty was bound over. (8/22/14
Tr., p.78, L.16 – p.79, L.19.)
Mr. Dougherty’s district court arraignment was also dominated by the counsel question.
The district court started by asking Mr. Dougherty if he wanted an attorney, and Mr. Dougherty
responded: “I’ve been asking for the assistance of counsel since the beginning.” (9/12/14
Tr., p.14, Ls.9-11.) When the court sought clarification, Mr. Dougherty explained the same thing
he had explained to the magistrate—that he could not have someone represent him, but that he
would like “the assistance of counsel,” i.e., someone to help him “communicate effectively” with
the court.4 (9/12/14 Tr., p.14, L.15 – p.16, L.9.) The district court then asked him to fill out the
public defender application to ensure he was indigent and could be provided assistance at county
expense.

(See 9/12/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.5-20; see also 9/12/14 Tr., p.24, Ls.5-24.)

However,

Mr. Dougherty did not fully complete the application, 5 and the arraignment ended without
counsel being appointed in any capacity. (See 9/12/14 Tr., p.16, L.19 – p.25, L.3.)
At some point, Mr. Dougherty submitted a partially-completed financial disclosure form
(see R., pp.29-30) and a handwritten “Motion for Court Appointed Co-Counsel or Assistance of
Counsel” (see R., p.32).6 Although Mr. Dougherty’s financial disclosure was not complete, it

4

Initially, it appears the district court did not understand what Mr. Dougherty was asking for
since, during a period of cross-talk, it started to warn him of the dangers of self-representation.
(See 9/12/14 Tr., p.15, L.13 – p.16, L.9.) It appears, however, that the court quickly realized
Mr. Dougherty was not seeking to represent himself. (See 9/12/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.5-14.)
5
Mr. Dougherty repeatedly asserted that he needed the assistance of counsel in even completing
the financial disclosure form. (See, e.g., 9/12/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.21-22, p.18, Ls.9-13.)
6
Both documents were filed on September 16, 2014. (R., pp.29-30, 32.) It is not clear if the
financial disclosure form was the same one discussed at the September 12, 2014 arraignment, or
if Mr. Dougherty filled out and submitted a new one.
4

asserted he was homeless and had no income, thereby clearly establishing he was indigent. (See
R., pp.29-20.)
A hearing was held on Mr. Dougherty’s motion a couple days later. At that hearing, the
district court recognized that Mr. Dougherty’s disclosures “may not be entirely up to par,” but it
indicated it would appoint the public defender “to assist” Mr. Dougherty “in [his] trial” (but not
“represent” him). (9/19/14 Tr., p.26, L.7 – p.27, L.25.) Unfortunately, because the district court
made no effort to define the parameters of counsel’s appointment, it was not entirely clear
whether counsel was being appointed in a hybrid (co-counsel) capacity or an advisory capacity.
Initially, William Butler was appointed to assist Mr. Dougherty. (R., p.30.) Apparently,
Mr. Butler retired a short time later and Clayton Andersen became the new public defender
responsible for assisting Mr. Dougherty. (See 7/14/15 Tr., p.40, L.25 – p.41, L.5.)
At a pretrial conference less than two months later, it became clear that Mr. Dougherty
and Mr. Andersen already had a strained relationship.

Mr. Dougherty was frustrated that

Mr. Andersen was hard to get a hold of and had not completed certain tasks (see 11/14/14
Tr., p.33, L.24 – p.35, L.8), and Mr. Andersen appeared frustrated over the lack of clarity of his
role, although he confirmed that he would “be here to assist” as Mr. Dougherty represented
himself (11/14/14 Tr., p.33, Ls.5-20). In response, the district court told Mr. Dougherty that he
had misunderstood the public defender’s role in his case: “No, no, no, no.

You seem to

misunderstand. You did not want an attorney appointed for you. You wanted someone to sit by
and be able to advise you on procedural things. And Mr. Andersen . . . indicated he’s willing to
do that.” (11/14/14 Tr., p.35, Ls.12-18.) Subsequently, the court informed Mr. Dougherty that
he was actually representing himself, and that he could not rely on Mr. Andersen as co-counsel
or hybrid counsel, only as advisory counsel. (See, e.g., 11/14/14 Tr., p.36, Ls.7-9 (“You’re the

5

one who wanted to represent yourself. So make your motions, and we’ll hear them.”), p.36,
Ls.15-19 (“You’re representing yourself. And we went through this. We’re not going to replow
that ground now.”), p.37, Ls.5-15 (“They were appointed in the capacity you requested . . . .
You asked [for] somebody to sit by and be able to advise you during the trial as to objections to
make, procedurally where to go.

I honored your request.”).)

Mr. Dougherty was clearly

surprised and confused by the court’s position as to the role of counsel. (See, e.g., 11/14/14
Tr., p.36, L.20 – p.37, L.10 (“So—so you’ve appointed—okay. What is going on now? So
there’s counsel? There’s not a counsel? You’re just confusing me now. . . . So—so there was
something . . . something that says that was appointed, there was somebody appointed? In what
capacity were they appointed . . . Co-counsel?”), p.37, L.24 – p.38, L.14 (“I have not consented
to any of this at any point in this matter. . . . [W]hen we came in here, supposedly I was
represented, and now, when we’re leaving, I’m supposedly not. So I need time to speak with
whoever it is that I have to speak with, whoever this—the interpreter or whatever it is now. I
need this defined. I need you to tell me specifically what is going on here.”).) No further
clarification of the role of counsel was provided by the court, and Mr. Andersen stayed on in
some ill-defined advisory capacity. (See 11/14/14 Tr., p.38, L.2 – p.41, L.14.)
As if there had not been enough confusion over the counsel issue, private counsel
suddenly substituted in as counsel for Mr. Dougherty—apparently without Mr. Dougherty’s
permission. On January 5, 2015, D. Scot Nass filed a notice of substitution of counsel indicating
he would be representing Mr. Dougherty. (Aug., pp.1-2.) However, as Mr. Dougherty made
abundantly clear, he had never consented to Mr. Nass representing him. (1/23/15 Tr., p.43,
Ls.12-15 (“I didn’t—I never—I didn’t know he was getting on the case.”); 3/10/15 Tr., p.12,
Ls.3-8 (“We had a hearing because there was an error or—on some attorney that got onto the

6

case that I didn’t hire, that I didn’t know was going to be on the case or that—you know, once he
made—there was an error in some attorney making appearance on the case.”), p.19, Ls.19-21
(“Mr. Nass. Never hired him. There’s no—he shouldn’t have been on the record. He shouldn’t
have [b]een trying to act for me or whatever.”); 7/14/15 Tr., p.39, Ls.15-19 (“We had a hearing
to clarify the error of this individual getting on the record, that he hadn’t been hired . . . and that
there was an error in him being—making an appearance . . . .”); 11/6/15 Tr., p.182, Ls.18-21
(“We had a problem with your court system where some other attorney jumped on without being
hired, jumped on and made themselves some of attorney of record . . . .”) And, as strange as it
may sound, Mr. Nass’s own representations to the court support Mr. Dougherty’s contention that
Mr. Nass entered an appearance without Mr. Dougherty’s consent.

Mr. Nass explained as

follows:
About the first of the year I was contacted by Mr. Dougherty’s father requesting
[a] second opinion and analysis of the factual procedural background. And in
order to be able to do that, I substituted in for Mr. Andersen. And the ROA
indicates that was about January 5.
I was able to review the materials from the prosecutor and
[Mr. Andersen’s] file as well as Mr. Dougherty’s file, and I met with
Mr. Dougherty. I gave him [a] legal analysis. And during that conversation, then,
he indicated that I probably was not the best fit for him representing him [sic]
going forward. And so, therefore, he has requested that I withdraw.
(1/23/15 Tr., p.42, L.20 – p.43, L.7 (emphasis added).)
A mere 16 days after entering an appearance on Mr. Dougherty’s behalf, Mr. Nass filed a
motion to withdraw, citing a breakdown in the “attorney/client relationship.” (R., p.43.) At the
hearing on that motion, Mr. Nass gave the above-quoted explanation of how he came to
“represent” Mr. Dougherty, and asked for leave to withdraw—again based on a breakdown in the
relationship. (1/23/15 Tr., p.42, L.16 – p.43, L.11.) When asked if Mr. Nass’ withdrawal was
his wish, Mr. Dougherty responded, “Yeah. I didn’t—I never—I didn’t know he was getting on

7

the case.” (1/23/15 Tr., p.43, Ls.12-15.) After hearing no objection from the State, the court
granted Mr. Nass’s motion, leaving Mr. Dougherty without counsel, hybrid or otherwise.
(1/23/15 Tr., p.45, Ls.13-20; R., p.50.) At no point did the district court inquire as to whether
Mr. Dougherty wanted to represent himself, and at no point did it caution him against the
dangers of self-representation. (See generally 1/23/15 Tr., p.42, L.16 – p.45, L.20.) In fact,
when Mr. Dougherty brought up the question of counsel going forward, the court was unwilling
to address that issue, repeatedly telling Mr. Dougherty there were no issues remaining before the
court and even threatening to have him jailed as he continued to try to discuss his concern. (See
1/23/15 Tr., p.45, L.21 – p.49, L.6.) The only thing the court would tell Mr. Dougherty was,
“Obviously you had the ability to hire counsel; so that’s up to you to go . . . to hire your own
attorney.”

(1/23/15 Tr., p.48, Ls.2-5.)

Of course, that was not true.

As Mr. Dougherty

explained, “That was somebody else trying to donate me counsel . . . .” (1/23/15 Tr., p.48, Ls.78.) And this explanation was supported by that of Mr. Nass, who just minutes earlier had told
the court he had been engaged by Mr. Dougherty’s father. (1/23/15 Tr., p.42, Ls.20-22.) Indeed,
there is absolutely no evidence in the record to suggest Mr. Dougherty personally retained
Mr. Nass, or that he ever had the financial ability to do so.
Approximately six weeks later, Mr. Dougherty appeared pro se for his originallyscheduled trial date. Early in that proceeding, Mr. Dougherty recapped for the court the recent
problems concerning counsel issue, 7 and again requested the assistance of counsel. (3/10/15
Tr., p.11, L.22 – p.24, L.13.) He asserted, “I still need counsel. I still want, you know—you, I

7

Whereas Judge Gibler had presided over the prior district court proceedings, the March trial
was set before Judge Luster. Judge Luster was clearly aware of what was reflected in the court
file (see 3/10/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.9-24), but obviously would not have known precisely what was
said at the various hearings (see, e.g., 3/10/15 Tr., p.17, L.2 – p.19, L.5).
8

still require counsel.” (3/10/15 Tr., p.12, L.25 – p.13, L.1; see also 3/10/15 Tr., p.21, L.21 –
p.22, L.4 (clarifying that he still did not seek to represented by counsel, but rather sought an
opportunity to consult with counsel).) The district court denied Mr. Dougherty’s request though,
ruling that it was made too late, as it would delay the trial. (3/10/15 Tr., p.22, L.11 – p.23, L.3.)
Ultimately though, the trial was continued anyway, as Judge Luster wound up being disqualified.
(3/10/15 Tr., p.26, L.6 – p.31, L.19.)
Approximately four months later, on the day of his re-scheduled trial, Mr. Dougherty
filed a written motion seeking a continuance based, in part, on the denial of his right to counsel.
(R., pp.68-70.) That same day, Mr. Dougherty again appeared pro se for his trial. 8 At the outset
of the proceeding, the district court orally denied Mr. Dougherty’s motion for a continuance.
(7/14/15 Tr., p.33, L.13 – p.35, L.4.) In relevant part, the court ruled that there was no Sixth
Amendment violation because Mr. Dougherty had “hired his own attorney, who withdrew
subsequently. . . . And Mr. Dougherty has had ample time up to this point to hire another
attorney and apparently has chosen not to do so.”

(7/14/15 Tr., p.33, L.24 – p.34, L.9.)

Thereafter, Mr. Dougherty made a lengthy record of the counsel issue (7/14/15 Tr., p.39, L.8 –
p.43, L.2), during which he repeatedly reiterated his request for the assistance of counsel (see,
e.g., 7/14/15 Tr., p.41, Ls.14-17 (“I’ve been asking. I’m still asking for assistance of counsel,
and I don’t see how things can go—things can proceed without the assistance of counsel.”), p.42,
Ls.14-19 (“[F]or the record I’m asking now and previously and in the future for assistance of
counsel.”), p.43, Ls.14-16 (“Your Honor, I don’t see how I’m going to be able to participate in

8

At the re-set trial date, Judge Gibler again presided.
9

this without assistance of counsel.”)). The district court was unmoved, telling Mr. Dougherty his
request was made too late. (See 7/14/15 Tr., p.42, Ls.8-19.)9
At various points during the ensuing trial, Mr. Dougherty lodged his objections to the
trial taking place without his having been provided with the assistance of counsel. (See, e.g.,
7/14/15 Tr., p.64, Ls.9-15, p.75, L.23 – p.78, L.16, p.143, L.13 – p.147, L.2, p.153, L.6 – p.154,
L.13, p.166, L.24 – p.169, L.12.) Generally though, Mr. Dougherty refused to participate in the
trial. (See generally 7/14/15 Tr., p.46, L.20 – p.171, L.11.) As a consequence, the State’s
evidence (summarized above) went virtually unchallenged. Ultimately, the jury came back with
a guilty verdict. (7/14/15 Tr., p.170, L.18 – p.171, L.5; R., p.77.)
Fourteen days after his trial, Mr. Dougherty filed what was, in substance, a motion for a
new trial, based on the violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. (See R., pp.81-123.) That
motion argued, inter alia, that, because he had not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
chosen to represent himself, he should never have been left to fend for himself at trial. (See
R., pp.95-103.)
At a subsequent hearing, Mr. Dougherty’s motion for a new trial was tangentially
discussed, although its merits were not argued. In the process of arguing at length about whether
Mr. Dougherty would receive the “assistance of counsel” going forward in the post-trial
proceedings,10 the district court repeatedly hinted that it was going to grant his motion for a new

9

All of these discussions were held in the presence of the jury panel.
After Mr. Dougherty once more reiterated his request for hybrid counsel (“second chair”
counsel), the court indicated it would appoint counsel, and it would be up to the appointed
attorney to define the parameters of the representation. (11/6/15 Tr., p.194, L.9 – p.198, L.9; see
also R., p.181 (order appointing counsel, Stacia Hagerty).) This arrangement was terminated by
the court a few weeks later though. Ms. Hagerty had filed a motion seeking clarification from
the court as to what her role was to be going forward. (See R., pp.182, 184-87.) When that
motion came up for hearing, a bizarre exchange took place between Mr. Dougherty and the
court, during which Mr. Dougherty continued to request “the assistance of counsel,” i.e., hybrid
10

10

trial. (See, e.g., 11/6/15 Tr., p.188, Ls.23-25 (“I’m offering you counsel and that counsel can
argue a motion for a new trial. And I will probably grant you a motion for a new trial.”), p.193,
L.20 – p.194, L.4 (“I’m trying to get him an attorney, I’m trying to get him a way to get a new
trial if that’s what he wants. But he’s not cooperating . . . .”); see also 12/11/15 Tr., p.205,
Ls.14-17 (the court, at a subsequent hearing, summarizing its statements at the prior hearing as
follows: “I think you saw that I was doing everything I could to try and get him an attorney to
help him and even stated that, if—I certainly want to hear input from the State, but that I’d be
inclined, if he wanted an attorney to represent him and if he qualified, then we could—in all
likelihood I’d grant him a new trial”).)
No hearing was ever held on Mr. Dougherty’s motion for a new trial. Rather, after the
hearing at which the district court became extremely frustrated with Mr. Dougherty’s requests
for the “assistance of counsel,” the court backtracked on its prior statements suggesting it was
willing to grant a new trial, and it entered a written order denying his motion. (R., pp.194-200.)
Nowhere in that order, however, did the district court address Mr. Dougherty’s contention that
after Mr. Nass was allowed to withdraw, he was left pro se without ever having knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. (See R., pp.194-200.)

counsel, and the district court vacillated back and forth between offering a binary choice of
Mr. Dougherty being represented or not represented, and offering the “assistance of counsel,” as
Mr. Dougherty requested. (See 12/11/15 Tr., p.209, L.18 – p.213, L.17.) (It appears that despite
Mr. Dougherty’s incessant requests for hybrid counsel, i.e., “co-counsel,” “second chair”
counsel, and “the assistance of counsel,” the district court still may not have understood what
Mr. Dougherty sought, or at least what to do with that request.) At the end of that discussion, the
district court became exasperated, repeatedly threatening to jail Mr. Dougherty, and relieving
Ms. Hagerty with little explanation. (12/11/15 Tr., p.212, L.19 – p.213, L.15.)
11

Thereafter, Mr. Dougherty appeared for his sentencing hearing pro se.11 He received a
withheld judgment and a two-year period of probation. (2/19/16 Tr., p.247, Ls.9-14; R., pp.20417.) Subsequently, he was found to have violated his probation and the district court imposed a
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, but it also retained jurisdiction. 12 (6/8/16 Tr., p.90,
Ls.8-18; R., pp.284-88.)

Following a successful rider, the district court suspended

Mr. Dougherty’s sentence and returned him to probation, this time for a term of five years.13
(12/21/16 Tr., p.11, Ls.3-10.)
In the meantime, Mr. Dougherty had filed a notice of appeal that was timely from the
order withholding judgment. (R., pp.224-26.) On appeal, Mr. Dougherty contends the district
court erred in forcing him to go to trial and sentencing pro se, without him having been given a
Faretta warning or otherwise knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily choosing to represent
himself. He further contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial,
which had been based, in part, on the same argument.
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At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Dougherty continued to demand the assistance of counsel.
(See, e.g., 2/19/16 Tr., p.217, L.14 – p.218, L.4, p.219, L.19 – p.220, L.25.)
12
During the probation violation proceedings, Mr. Dougherty continued to demand the
assistance of counsel. (See, e.g., 5/25/16 Tr., p.8, Ls.166-73; R., pp.253, 254.) In response, a
public defender was appointed. (R., p.269.) It appears that that attorney, Jonathan Hull, saw
himself as hybrid counsel, as he drafted motions that were signed by Mr. Dougherty. (See, e.g.,
R., pp.270-71, 272-73, 274-75.) This interpretation seems to have been consistent with the
court’s understanding. (See 6/8/16 Tr., p.6, L.23 – p.7, L.7 (“I am requiring Mr. Hull to remain
throughout the proceedings here this morning, and you can use him however you wish. It is up
to you to decide whether he fully represents you in these proceedings. It’s up to him whether
you ask him for assistance through these proceedings. You can decide not to utilize him at all,
not to talk to him at all, in which case he will still remain here in the courtroom beside you as
standby counsel in case you change your mind.”).) At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Hull acted in
a true hybrid capacity. (Compare, e.g., 6/8/16 Tr., p.39, L.10 – p.53, L.16 (Mr. Dougherty crossexamining a State’s witness himself), with 6/8/16 Tr., p.76, L.5 – p.77, L.7 (Mr. Dougherty
relying on Mr. Hull to make a closing argument).)
13
Mr. Dougherty had the assistance of Mr. Hull during the rider review hearing, and Mr. Hull
did most of the talking. (See generally 12/21/16 Tr., p.3, L.1 – p.16, L.19.)
12

ISSUE
Did the district court violate Mr. Dougherty’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it allowed
his counsel to withdraw, leaving Mr. Dougherty unrepresented for trial and sentencing, without
first administering a Faretta warning or otherwise ensuring that Mr. Dougherty was knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his right to counsel and choosing to represent himself?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Violated Mr. Dougherty’s Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel When It
Allowed His Counsel To Withdraw, Leaving Mr. Dougherty Unrepresented For Trial And
Sentencing, Without First Administering A Faretta Warning Or Otherwise Ensuring That
Mr. Dougherty Was Knowingly, Intelligently, And Voluntarily Waiving His Right To Counsel
And Choosing To Represent Himself
Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant not only has a right to the assistance
of counsel, but also a right of self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
However, in order for a defendant to represent himself, he must first knowingly and intelligently
waive the right to counsel.

Id. at 835.

He “should be made aware of the dangers and

disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is
doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’” Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
It is the State’s burden to prove that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his right to counsel and chose to represent himself. United States v. Mohawk,
20 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1994); State v. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho 628, 633 (2007); State v.
Jackson, 140 Idaho 636, 639 (Ct. App. 2004). If the State cannot meet its burden of showing a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, the defendant’s selfrepresentation constitutes error, and that error requires automatic reversal of his conviction.
Mohawk, 20 F.3d at 1484-85; Jackson, 140 Idaho at 641.
In this case, the State cannot meet its burden and, therefore, Mr. Dougherty’s conviction
should be vacated. Not only did the district court fail to give Mr. Dougherty a Faretta warning,
but it failed to make even the most basic inquiry into whether Mr. Dougherty actually wished to
represent himself. Indeed, the record clearly indicates he did not. At virtually every turn,
Mr. Dougherty demanded the assistance of counsel.
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A.

The District Court Erred In Failing To Give Mr. Dougherty A Faretta Warning Or
Otherwise Ensuring That He Was Knowingly, Intelligently, And Voluntarily Waiving
His Right To Counsel And Choosing To Represent Himself
Relatively early in this case, the public defender was appointed to assist (but not

represent) Mr. Dougherty. (9/19/14 Tr., p.26, L.7 – p.27, L.25; R., p.30.)14 Thereafter, on
January 5, 2015, a private attorney, Scot Nass entered an appearance on Mr. Dougherty’s behalf.
(Aug., pp.1-2.) Thus, rightly or wrongly, 15 Mr. Nass was Mr. Dougherty’s counsel of record for
a time.
A couple weeks later, when Mr. Nass moved to withdraw, Mr. Dougherty readily
consented to his withdrawal (see 1/23/15 Tr., p.43, Ls.12-15); however, he did so without ever
being told what would come next (see generally 1/23/15 Tr., p.42, L.1 – p.49, L.6). He was not
told that he would be left completely unrepresented; he was never asked if he wanted to represent
himself; and he was certainly never warned of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation. (See generally 1/23/15 Tr., p.42, L.1 – p.49, L.6.) Nor did Mr. Dougherty ever
express a desire to represent himself. Quite to the contrary, immediately after the district court
allowed Mr. Nass to withdraw, leaving Mr. Dougherty wholly unrepresented, Mr. Dougherty
spoke up, expressing his continued desire for the assistance of counsel:
THE DEFENDANT: I still have business with the Court here. Sir?
THE COURT: Okay. We’ll take up State versus Lee Pullen, Case No. 15-34.
THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me, Judge. I’m not finished here.
THE COURT: You’re finished here. There was no other motion before me. If
you’ve got a motion you want to file, file it, and we’ll take it up.
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As noted above, the public defender’s expected role was not made entirely by the clear by the
court and, thus, there some confusion as to what the public defender should have been doing in
assisting Mr. Dougherty.
15
As discussed above, every indication is that Mr. Dougherty never actually consented to
Mr. Nass’ representation.
15

THE DEFENDANT: I’ve been requesting counsel so I can file that.
obviously—

I’m

THE COURT: Obviously you had the ability to hire counsel[16]; so that’s up to
you to go—
THE DEFENDANT: No, actually I do not have—
THE COURT: —to hire your own attorney.
THE DEFENDANT: —the ability to [hire] counsel. That was somebody else
trying to donate me counsel and then—
THE COURT: That’s up—
THE DEFENDANT: —and stipulate how—
THE COURT: That’s up to you, sir.
THE DEFENDANT: —stipulate how I—
THE COURT: Sir, that’s up to you. You’re done here today.
THE DEFENDANT: I object.
THE COURT: Fine. You object—
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To the extent that the district court’s assertion that Mr. Dougherty “[o]bviously … had the
ability to hire counsel” could be considered a factual finding, it was clearly erroneous and should
be set aside. This Court may set aside a trial court's findings of fact if they are clearly erroneous.
McCray v. Rosenkrance, 135 Idaho 509, 513 (2001); In re Williamson v. City of McCall, 135
Idaho 452, 454 (2001). In deciding whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court
determines whether the findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence. In re
Williamson at 454.
Here, there was not substantial, competent evidence for the district court to conclude
Mr. Dougherty was able to hire an attorney. In fact, there is absolutely no evidence in the record
to suggest Mr. Dougherty had the means to hire counsel. The information on Mr. Dougherty’s
financial disclosure form indicates he was homeless and jobless and, as noted, based on that
form, a public defender had previously been appointed to assist him. (See R., pp.29-30; 9/19/14
Tr., p.26, L.7 – p.28, L.1.) After that, the only thing that changed was that Mr. Nass, a private
attorney, had entered an appearance, on Mr. Dougherty’s behalf. However, there is no evidence
in the record to suggest Mr. Dougherty ever paid (or intended to pay) Mr. Nass. In fact, both
Mr. Dougherty and Mr. Nass indicated Mr. Nass had been engaged by a third party—
Mr. Dougherty’s father. (See 1/23/15 Tr., p.42, Ls.20-25, p.48, Ls.4-8.)
Regardless, even if Mr. Dougherty had the means to hire private counsel, he still should
not have been forced to proceed pro se in the absence of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of his right to counsel. See State v. Farfan-Galvan, 161 Idaho 610, 613-15 (2016).
16

THE DEFENDANT: I’ve been—
THE COURT: You object—
THE DEFENDANT: I’ve been asking for counsel—
THE COURT: You objected. You have no motion before me. You’ve got
nothing pending before me.
THE DEFENDANT: Sir, I’m—
THE COURT: I’ve got—
THE DEFENDANT: I’m entitled to counsel at all parts of this.
THE COURT: You’re about ten seconds away from having me have that deputy
sheriff take you away.
Thank you, Mr. Nass.
THE DEFENDANT: I object.
(Proceedings concluded at 9:40 a.m.)
(1/23/15 Tr., p.47, L.16 – p.49, L.6.) Notably, Mr. Dougherty continued to express his desire for
the assistance of counsel when he appeared pro se for: (1) his originally-scheduled trial date
(see, e.g., 3/10/15 Tr., p.13, L.25 – p.14, L.7 (explaining that allowing Mr. Nass to withdraw
only “half fixed” the error of Mr. Nass’s unauthorized appearance because the public defender
was not re-appointed), p.24, Ls.21-24 (specifically requesting the assistance of counsel)); (2) his
re-set trial date (see, e.g., 7/14/15 Tr., p.39, L.22 – p.40, L.5 (objecting to the fact that the public
defender had not been reappointed with Mr. Nass was allowed to withdraw), p.42, Ls.8-10
(specifically requesting the assistance of counsel); and (3) his sentencing hearing (see, e.g.,
2/19/16 Tr., p.217, Ls.14-21 (objecting to the fact that he was being denied the assistance of
counsel).
Plainly, Mr. Dougherty did not choose to go to trial pro se; nor did he choose to forgo
counsel at his sentencing hearing. At virtually every turn, he sought the “assistance of counsel,”
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which he envisioned as hybrid counsel (“co-counsel”). Although such hybrid representation is
fundamentally different from traditional representation by counsel, it certainly is not selfrepresentation. See Colquitt, Joseph, Hybrid Representation: Standing the Two-Sided Coin on its
Edge, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 59-77 (2003) (detailing the various types of representation
available to criminal defendants, and making it clear that while “advisory” and “standby”
counsel are modified forms of self-representation, “hybrid counsel” or “co-counsel” is a form of
representation by counsel). Thus, when Mr. Dougherty requested the assistance of counsel, he
cannot be deemed to have been invoking his right to self-representation. Further, even if this
Court were to construe hybrid counsel as a variation of self-representation, such that
Mr. Dougherty’s demand for the “assistance of counsel” could be characterized as a request to
represent himself, the fact is that any such requests could not be said to have been knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary. He certainly did not envision his requests as a plea to go it alone at
trial or sentencing. (See, e.g., 7/14/15 Tr., p.43, Ls.14-16 (“Your Honor, I don’t see how I’m
going to be able to participate in this without the assistance of counsel.”).) Mr. Dougherty was
never told that his demands for hybrid counsel or co-counsel would leave him wholly unassisted
at trial and/or sentencing, and he was certainly never apprised of the dangers and disadvantages
of persisting with his demands. Accordingly, the district court violated his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.
Although Mr. Dougherty plainly objected to the district court compelling him to proceed
to trial and sentencing pro se, he did not specifically invoke Faretta’s requirement of a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel which included recognition of the
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dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. 17

Because Mr. Dougherty continuously

objected to the district court’s decision to leave him without counsel for trial or sentencing, he
contends the claims made on appeal are adequately preserved.

See Ada County Highway

District v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, __, 395 P.3d 357, 361 n.2 (2017) (holding that
while an appellant may not raise a new “substantive issue” on appeal, where that issue was
repeatedly discussed below, it is preserved for appeal even if “specific arguments” evolve by the
time of appeal). However, to the extent that this Court disagrees, he argues in the alternative that
the district court’s error in this case satisfies the standard for fundamental error. See State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010) (adopting a three-part standard for presentation of appellate
claims of unpreserved error).

First, the error goes to an unwaived constitutional right—

Mr. Dougherty’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Second, the error plainly exists. The Sixth
Amendment violation is clear from the record for the reasons set forth above. And there was no
objectively reasonable strategic or tactical reason for Mr. Dougherty not to have specifically
cited the Faretta standard. Finally, the error was not harmless. It cannot be harmless, as the
acceptance of a “waiver” of counsel that was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given
is a structural error that is not subject to a harmless error analysis. United States v. Mohawk, 20
F.3d 1480, 1484-85 (9th Cir. 1994); State v. Jackson, 140 Idaho 636, 641 (Ct. App. 2004). See
also Weaver v. Massachusetts, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907-08 (2017) (holding that
violation of the defendant’s right to self-representation is a structural error).
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Of course, if Mr. Dougherty, a layman acting pro se, would have had the legal expertise to
make such a specific argument, there would be no reason for Faretta’s requirement that
defendants be warned of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation in the first place.
Thus, it would be absurd to require pro se defendants to specifically cite Faretta in order to
preserve for appeal their challenges to Faretta violations.
19

Whether the Sixth Amendment violation in this case is reviewed as preserved error or
fundamental error, the result should be the same. This Court should hold that where the district
court allowed Mr. Dougherty’s attorney to withdraw (leaving Mr. Dougherty unrepresented for
purposes of his trial and sentencing), without having first obtained a waiver of Mr. Dougherty’s
right to counsel, much less a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver which included a
warning as to the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, it violated his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.

B.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Dougherty’s Motion For A New Trial
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-2406(5) and Idaho Criminal Rule 34, a defendant may

seek a new trial if the district court erred as to a decision of law during the course of the trial, so
long as the motion is timely filed. Here, Mr. Dougherty filed a timely motion for a new trial,
based in relevant part on the district court’s legal error in failing to give him a Faretta warning or
otherwise obtain a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel before
forcing him to proceed to trial pro se. (See R., pp.95-103.) This is a proper basis for a new trial
under section 19-2406(5).
Although the district court initially suggested it would be willing to grant
Mr. Dougherty’s motion for a new trial (see 11/6/15 Tr., p.188, Ls.23-25, p.193, L.20 – p.194,
L.4; 12/11/15 Tr., p.205, Ls.14-17), after becoming frustrated with him at an intervening hearing
(see 12/11/15 Tr., p.210, L.17 – p.213, L.15), the court denied his motion without a hearing on
the merits (see R., pp.194-200). The district court’s order, however, failed to directly address the
contention relevant to this appeal—whether it had previously erred in failing to give
Mr. Dougherty a Faretta warning or otherwise obtaining a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
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waiver of his right to counsel before forcing him to go to trial pro se. (See generally R., pp.194200.)
Because the district court denied his motion in toto, Mr. Dougherty contends it implicitly
rejected his contention that it had previously erred in forcing him to go to trial pro se without
having given him a Faretta warning or otherwise obtaining a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of the right to counsel. Assuming that to be the case, Mr. Dougherty contends the district
court erred for the very same reasons that are detailed in Section A, above (which are
incorporated herein by this reference).
Alternatively though, to the extent that this Court determines the district court’s order
denying Mr. Dougherty’s motion for a new trial failed to decide the critical issue, he asks that
this Court remand the case to the district court for a ruling on this issue.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Dougherty respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his conviction and remand his case to the district court for a new trial.
DATED this 5th day of October, 2017.

_________/s/________________
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
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